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1 Introduction
The celebrated Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) for n-person
bargaining problems captures a simple intuition. Consider the disagreement point, that
is, the allocation which would result if negotiations broke down. Consider the exact
opposite, the utopical (and typically unattainable) allocation where everybody would be
granted his or her maximal aspirations. Starting from disagreement, increase the surplus
allocated to every agent in the direction of the utopian dream, increasing each agent’s
outcome in a proportional way. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution proposes to choose the
best allocation obtained through this procedure while maintaining feasibility.
This approach, however, ignores bargaining power, which has played a prominent
role in the bargaining literature even since Nash (1950). Thus, Kalai (1977) introduced
the proportional solutions, which choose the best feasible point along the line starting
at disagreement and proceeding “up” in a direction determined exclusively by an exoge-
nous vector of bargaining weights. As a consequence, the utopian point plays no role
whatsoever in the proportional solutions: they anchor on disagreement. Conversely, the
equal-losses solutions of Chun (1988) choose the best feasible point along the line start-
ing at utopia and proceeding “down” in a direction determined exclusively by the vector
of bargaining weights. In those solutions, the disagreement point plays no role. How-
ever, the symmetry with respect to the proposal of Kalai (1977) is imperfect, because,
as shown by Chun and Peters (1991), the equal-losses solutions can fail to prescribe a
feasible allocation for three or more agents.
Thomson (1994) introduced the weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, which rec-
ommend the maximal point along the line starting at disagreement and proceeding
up in a direction determined by both the utopia point and the vector of bargaining
weights. The gradual increments starting at the disagreement point are required to
be made proportionally to both the bargaining power and the utopian claims, while in
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution they would follow the line connecting disagreement to
utopia. Even though the utopia point is taken into account to compute the weighted
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, this solution concept is clearly anchored on disagreement.
In this paper, we propose an intuitive bargaining solution anchoring on utopia, taking
into account bargaining power, and delivering attainable allocations for any number of
agents. The new solution fills a gap in the literature by providing a logical counterpart to
(weighted) Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions which anchor on disagreement. Specifically, the
proposal is as follows. Anchor on the utopian ideal. Reduce each individual aspiration,
as captured by the utopia point, by the bargaining power parameter. The resulting point
can be shown to be always feasible, and typically in the interior of the bargaining set.
Now choose the best allocation along the line connecting the utopia point and the new
reference point. This procedure can be seen as allocating losses with respect to utopia,
or as allocating gains from the endogenous reference point in the direction of utopia.
Implicitly, the procedure asks agents to identify their maximal aspirations and proposes
the outcome of a negotiation which takes into account bargaining power, feasibility, and
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the desire to approach the utopia point. Hence, we call our proposal the negotiated
aspirations solution.
To understand what this solution actually entails, we provide full axiomatic char-
acterizations. For the two-agent case, surprisingly, the solution is characterized by a
combination of well-established axioms, namely strong Pareto optimality, scale invari-
ance (Nash, 1950), restricted monotonicity (Rosenthal, 1976), and a natural restriction
of the concavity axiom (Myerson, 1981), which we introduce here and call restricted
concavity. For the general case of n-agent bargaining problems, the negotiated aspi-
rations solution is characterized by the same properties with three differences. First,
weak Pareto optimality replaces the strong version. Second, restricted contraction inde-
pendence (Roth, 1977) is added. Third, a minimal condition has to be added, namely
the property that, if utopia were actually available (and hence there is no bargaining
“problem”), the solution would choose it (“utopia fulfillment”).
The negotiated aspirations solution is also conceptually related to other solutions
proposed in the literature. First, the idea of minimizing losses while anchoring on the
utopia point was previously explored by Yu (1973) and Freimer and Yu (1976), who
studied a family of solutions indexed by a parameter p determining the shape of the
indifference curves, encompassing the equal losses solution (Chun, 1988) (p =∞). These
solutions distribute losses from the utopia point keeping a fixed slope for every bargaining
set, with independence of the maximal aspiration of each agent. In contrast, in the
negotiated aspirations solution the slope depends on the utopia point, hence on the
maximal aspiration of each agent. Second, the concept of a reference point driving a
bargaining solution is well established, e.g., Salonen (1985, 1987) and Anbarci (1995).
In particular, a number of works have proposed solutions which proceed “upwards” from
a constructed reference point. The solution of Gupta and Livne (1988) is defined over
“bargaining triplets” which include a problem-specific, exogenously given reference point,
required to be Pareto-superior to the disagreement point but not Pareto optimal. The
solution’s outcome is the intersection between a ray connecting the exogenous reference
point with the utopia point and the bargaining set’s boundary. Balakrishnan et al (2011)
propose a similar solution using a ray connecting the exogenously given reference point
to a “tempered utopia,” i.e. a modified utopia point (in this sense, the authors call their
solution “dual” to the one by Gupta and Livne, 1988). More recently, Karago¨zoglu et al
(2015) have proposed a two-parameter family of bargaining solutions encompassing the
two concepts mentioned above. A key difference of our approach with respect to those
works is that the reference point is not exogenously given as part of the problem. Rather,
it is co-determined by the bargaining power of the agents and the maximal aspiration of
each agent given the bargaining set, and in this sense is endogenous.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation
and defines the negotiated aspirations solution. Section 3 then discusses the basic axioms
we require. Section 4 proves the characterization for the case of two agents. Section 5
presents the two last axioms and the characterization for the general case (n agents).
Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Bargaining Problems and the Negotiated Aspirations
Solution
A group of n agents, i = 1, . . . , n, need to agree on a utility vector from a set of potential
possibilities, S ⊆ Rn+. In case of disagreement, a default option or disagreement point
d = 0 ∈ S will be implemented. Formally, a bargaining problem is a pair (S,0) where S
is a compact, convex1 subset S ⊆ Rn+ (called the bargaining set) with 0 ∈ S such that the
following two properties are fulfilled. The first is a non-degeneracy condition requiring
that there exists x ∈ S such that xi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. The second, usually called
0-comprehensiveness, states that for every x ∈ S and every y ∈ Rn with 0 ≤ y ≤ x, it
follows that y ∈ S.2
Let Σ0 be the set of all bargaining problems of the form (S,0). A bargaining solution
(or simply a solution) is a function f : Σ0 7→ R
n
+ satisfying f(S,0) ∈ S for every
(S,0) ∈ Σ0; that is, given a bargaining problem (S,0), the solution f prescribes f(S,0).
For conciseness, since we assume d = 0, a bargaining problem (S,0) ∈ Σ0 will be denoted
simply by S from now on.3
For a given S ∈ Σ0, the utopia point m(S) ∈ R
n
+ is the point where each coordinate
i contains the maximum conceivable outcome for player i among individually rational
alternatives.4 Formally, for each i,
mi(S) = max {xi | x ≥ 0 and x ∈ S } .
To measure asymmetries in bargaining power, let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be a vector of bar-
gaining weights, i.e. α ∈ ∆n−1 =
{
β ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 βi = 1
}
. The key for the bargaining
solution we propose is the endogenous reference point
mα(S) = (α1m1(S), . . . , αnmn(S))
which is always feasible for every S ∈ Σ0, i.e. m
α(S) ∈ S.5 At this point, every agent
achieves a fraction of his or her utopian utility which is proportional to the agents’
bargaining power. That is, we start with (“anchor at”) the utopian point m(S), which
represents the maximal aspirations of the agents, and adjust them down tomα(S) taking
into account bargaining power. In this sense, the point mα(S) captures a starting point
for “negotiated aspirations.” In general, mα(S) might be in the interior of S, that is,
1Most of the literature concentrates on bargaining over convex sets. See, however, Conley and Wilkie
(1996), Hougaard and Tvede (2003), and Qin et al (2015).
2The vector notation y ≥ x means yi ≥ xi for i = 1, . . . , n; y > x means y ≥ x and y 6= x.
3The assumption d = 0 is without loss of generality if we consider solutions satisfying translation
invariance, i.e. the property that f(S + {t}, d + t) = f(S, d) + t for all t ∈ Rn. This is because for any
pair (S, d), by translation invariance f(S, d) = f(S − {d}, 0) + d, and (S − {d},0) ∈ Σ0. That is, the
restriction of f to Σ0 completely determines f .
4An allocation x is individually rational if x ≥ d. Since we assume d = 0 and S ⊆ Rn+, individ-
ual rationality is guaranteed. Peters (1986) defines utopia points without the individual rationality
constraint.
5To see this, let zi be an element of S where the problem max {xi | x ≥ 0 and x ∈ S } achieves its
solution, hence zi ≥ 0 and zii = mi(S). Let zˆ
i be given by zˆii = mi(S) and zˆ
i
j = 0 for all j 6= i. Since S is
0-comprehensive, it follows that zˆi ∈ S for all i. Since S is convex, we obtain that mα(S) =
∑n
i=1
αizˆ
i ∈
S.
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Figure 1: The negotiated aspirations solution for 2 agents, α = (α1, 1− α1).
it will typically be possible to achieve a point closer to utopia. The negotiated aspira-
tions solution identifies the Pareto optimal point above mα(S) which respects the given
bargaining weights. The following definition gives the formal statement, and Figure 1
provides a graphical illustration for the case of two agents.
Definition 1. The negotiated aspirations solution with weights α ∈ ∆n−1 is given
by
NAα(S) = (1− λ∗)mα(S) + λ∗m(S)
for each S ∈ Σ0, where λ
∗ is the solution of the problem
max {λ ∈ [0, 1] | (1− λ)mα(S) + λm(S) ∈ S } .
The negotiated aspirations solution6 is a natural counterpart to and generalization
of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The latter prescribes the largest feasible point in the
ray connecting the disagreement point and the utopia point. In contrast, the negotiated
aspirations solution determines the line passing through the utopia point which respects
the pre-specified bargaining weights. Intuitively, the solution then minimizes the losses
with respect to the (typically unattainable) utopia point, distributing them according
to bargaining power. Hence, an alternative, more descriptive but uncomfortably long
name would be “the weighted proportional losses solution.”
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution corresponds to the particular case of the negoti-
ated aspirations solution where all agents have identical bargaining power, i.e. αKS =(
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
. This follows because the line determined by the utopia point and mα
KS
(S)
passes through the disagreement point. Hence, the negotiated aspirations solution can
be seen as a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution taking into account bar-
gaining power.
6Strictly speaking, this solution is actually a family of solutions, indexed by α. For simplicity, we
drop the dependence on α whenever it does not lead to confusion.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the negotiated aspirations solution and other solutions for 3
agents.
To clarify the intuition, Figure 2 illustrates the negotiated aspirations solution for the
case of n = 3 agents, compared to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and other prominent
solutions. For example, the equal losses solution (Chun, 1988) prescribes to reduce
aspirations proportionally to bargaining power starting from the utopia point, but can
fail individual rationality for n ≥ 3 (Chun and Peters, 1991; Herrero and Marco, 1993).
In contrast, NAα, although also based on reducing aspirations from utopia, always
satisfies individual rationality. Figure 2 illustrates this point. The triangular surface is
simply the simplex of a bargaining set S, i.e. the surface connecting the points zˆi with
zˆii = mi(S), zˆ
i
j = 0 for all j 6= i. The point NA
α(S) is simply the intersection of the
surface WPO(S) and the line from the utopia point to an endogenous reference point
which lies in the simplex, hence in S (and typically in its interior) . Hence individual
rationality is guaranteed.
A conceptual relation to the weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KSα) introduced
by Thomson (1994) can also be readily observed in Figure 2. This solution can be viewed
as prescribing an allocation of gains proportional to a given vector of bargaining weights
starting at the disagreement point. Hence, the constructions of KSα and NAα share
the same reference point in the simplex, but, while KSα anchors on disagreement, the
negotiated aspirations solution anchors on utopia. These two solutions can be considered
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dual in the sense that they allocate loses or gains (respectively) proportionally to the
maximum aspirations of agents (adjusted by bargaining power).7
A further, interesting conceptual relation is worth mentioning. Thomson (1981)
introduced the family of reference-function solutions which includes those resulting from
the intersection of the convex and comprehensive hull (the “upper” boundary of the
bargaining set) with all possible lines starting at the disagreement point. One could
define the family of dual-reference-function solutions by considering the intersections of
all possible lines starting at the utopia point with the convex and comprehensive hull.
This family includes the negotiated aspirations solution(s) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution.
3 Axioms
We now briefly present the properties which will be part of our characterizations. The
first is Pareto efficiency. It states that all gains from cooperation should be exhausted,
in the sense that the solution should not prescribe a Pareto-dominated alternative. The
strong Pareto frontier of S ∈ Σ0 is the set SPO(S) = {x ∈ S | if y > x then y /∈ S };
that is, the set of alternatives which are not Pareto-dominated by other alternatives in
S.
Strong Pareto optimality: For every S ∈ Σ0, then f(S) ∈ SPO(S).
This property is one of the axioms introduced by Nash (1950) as one of four axioms
characterizing the Nash Bargaining Solution. The adjective “strong” is added to dis-
tinguish it from weakenings as the following. Let the weak Pareto frontier be the set
WPO(S) = {x ∈ S | if yi > xi ∀i = 1, . . . , n then y /∈ S }.
Weak Pareto optimality: For every S ∈ Σ0, then f(S) ∈WPO(S).
The second property is scale invariance, also introduced by Nash (1950). Intuitively,
this property means that the scale of units in which each agent is measuring its utility
does not matter.
Scale invariance: For every S ∈ Σ0 and p ∈ R
n
++,
f(pS) = (p1f1(S), . . . , pnfn(S))
where pS = {(p1s1, . . . , pnsn) | s ∈ S }.
If a solution satisfies scale invariance, by non-degeneracy every bargaining set S can
be normalized by transforming it into a new bargaining set with utopia point m(S) =
(1, . . . , 1). That is, the solution is completely determined by its restriction to the set of
normalized bargaining problems in Σ0.
The third property concerns monotonicity. The simplest and strongest monotonicity
property simply states that, if the feasible set is expanded, no agent should lose utility.
However, it is well-known that, even for 2-agent problems, there is no solution satisfying
7This is conceptually similar to the notion of duality introduced by Thomson (2015a) for bankruptcy
problems, namely that the dual of a rule should allocate losses the same way the original rule allocates
gains.
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that version of monotonicity and strong Pareto optimality. Consequently, Rosenthal
(1976) introduced the restricted monotonicity axiom, which states that whenever the
expansion in the bargaining set does not alter the utopia point, no agent should lose
utility.8
Restricted monotonicity: For each pair S, T ∈ Σ0, if S ⊆ T and m(S) = m(T ) then
f(S) ≤ f(T ).
This property, used e.g. by Peters and Tijs (1985), is compatible with strong Pareto
optimality for n = 2 (but not for n ≥ 3; see Garc´ıa-Segarra and Gine´s-Vilar, 2015).
The last property we require is the axiom of concavity (Myerson, 1981), which is
related to the interpretation of bargaining problems under conditions of probabilistic
uncertainty. When this property is satisfied, agents are willing to reach an agreement
before the uncertainty is resolved because each and every agent benefits from this early
agreement (see Thomson, 1994, 2010).9
Concavity: For each S, T ∈ Σ0 and each λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λS + (1 − λ)T ) ≥ λf(S) + (1 −
λ)f(T ).
We will actually rely on a weaker concavity property, which was first introduced in
Garc´ıa-Segarra (2012). Suppose again that bargaining takes place now but the feasible
set will be known only later. However, agents additionally know that the utopia points
of all possible sets are identical, and hence there is no uncertainty in the reference
point represented by utopian anchors. The following property requires that, under these
conditions, agents prefer an early compromise to waiting for the resolution of uncertainty.
Restricted concavity: For each S, T ∈ Σ0 and each λ ∈ [0, 1], if m(S) = m(T ) then
f(λS + (1− λ)T ) ≥ λf(S) + (1− λ)f(T ).
The following result enumerates the properties satisfied by our solution.
Proposition 1. Let α ∈ ∆n−1. The negotiated aspirations solution with weights α
satisfies weak Pareto optimality, scale invariance, restricted monotonicity, and restricted
concavity.
Proof. Weak Pareto optimality, scale invariance, and restricted monotonicity are ob-
viously fulfilled. To see restricted concavity, let S, T ∈ Σ0 be bargaining sets with
m(S) = m(T ), and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. For convenience, denote
g(µ) = (1− µ)mα(S) + µm(S)
for each µ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that m(λS+(1−λ)T ) = m(S). By construction, there exist
r, s, t ∈ [0, 1] such that NAα(λS+(1−λ)T ) = g(r), NAα(S) = g(s), and NAα(T ) = g(t).
Note that λg(s) + (1 − λ)g(t) = g(λs + (1− λ)t). Since g(s) ∈ S and g(t) ∈ T , we have
that g(λs + (1 − λ)t) ∈ λS + (1 − λ)T and, by definition of NAα(λS + (1 − λ)T ), it
follows that NAα(λS + (1 − λ)T ) = g(r) ≥ g(λs + (1 − λ)t) = λg(s) + (1 − λ)g(t) =
λNAα(S) + (1− λ)NAα(T ). This completes the proof of restricted concavity.
8This axiom is also well-known in the domain of claims problems (see, e.g., Thomson, 2003, 2015a,b;
Harless, 2017).
9Alo´s-Ferrer et al (2017) show that, under strong Pareto optimality, concavity is equivalent to the
axiom of super-additivity (Perles and Maschler, 1981; Peters, 1985).
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4 The Two-Agents Case
In bargaining theory, the two-agent case is of fundamental importance. Many seminal
contributions have focused exclusively on this case, ranging from Nash (1950) to Peters
and Tijs (1985) and Dubra (2001). Often, extensions of results to the general case
remain elusive, and the n = 2 case remains a useful playground to test the compatibility
of desirable properties. We hence devote our attention to the two-agent setting before
tackling the general n-agent case.
Surprisingly, even though the solution we propose is new to the literature, for two
agents we obtain a characterization which relies exclusively on already-known, standard
axioms (or natural restrictions thereof). This observation is of independent interest, since
ex post our result provides an implementation for a combination of known, normatively
desirable properties.
For the case of two agents, we can give a simpler definition of the negotiated aspira-
tions solution as follows. First, abusing notation, write the vector of bargaining weights
as (α, 1 − α) with α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, given S ∈ Σ0 with m1(S) > 0 and m2(S) > 0,
NAα(S) is the largest (with respect to any coordinate with strictly positive bargaining
weight) point in S fulfilling the equation
α(m1(S)− x1)
m1(S)
=
(1− α)(m2(S)− x2)
m2(S)
,
which describes the line passing through m(S) and mα(S).
Before we state our characterization, we need a preliminary result. Peters and Tijs
(1985) introduce a family of bargaining solutions as follows. A monotonic curve is a
function γ : [1, 2] 7→ ∇ := conv{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} (where conv denotes the convex hull
of a set) fulfilling the following property.
(C) For all s, t ∈ [1, 2] with s ≤ t, γ(s) ≤ γ(t) and γ1(s) + γ2(s) = s.
Given a monotonic curve γ, the associated bargaining solution fγ is defined as follows.
For every two-agent problem S ∈ Σ0 with m(S) = (1, 1) (i.e., a normalized bargaining
problem), fγ(S) is the unique point of SPO(S) which lies on {γ(t) | t ∈ [1, 2]}. Extend
fγ to all S ∈ Σ0 by assuming scale invariance.
Given any α ∈ [0, 1], define the function γα : [1, 2] 7→ ∇ by γα(s) = (2 − s)(α, 1 −
α) + (s − 1)(1, 1) for all s ∈ [1, 2], that is, an affine function tracing a line from the
point (α, 1 − α) to (1, 1). Note that γα is a monotonic curve and fγ
α
= NAα. That
is, the negotiated aspirations solution belongs to the family of solutions fγ studied by
Peters and Tijs (1985). These authors show that the set of bargaining solutions fγ
is characterized by the combination of strong Pareto optimality, scale invariance, and
restricted monotonicity (Peters and Tijs, 1985, Proposition 1 and Theorems 2 and 3).
The proof of our characterization below relies on this result.
Theorem 1. Consider bargaining problems with two agents. The negotiated aspira-
tions solution is the only solution satisfying strong Pareto optimality, scale invariance,
restricted monotonicity, and restricted concavity.
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Proof. By Peters and Tijs (1985, Proposition 1 and Theorem 2), NAα = fγ
α
fulfills
strong Pareto optimality. The other properties hold by Proposition 1. Conversely,
suppose f satisfies all listed properties. By Peters and Tijs (1985, Proposition 1 and
Theorem 3), there exists a monotonic curve γ such that f(S) = fγ(S) for each bargaining
set S. Let α = γ1(1) ∈ [0, 1] and let
Vt =
{
x ∈ R2 | x1 + x2 ≤ t
}
∩ [0, 1]2
for each t ∈ [1, 2]. Notice that m(Vt) = (1, 1) for all t ∈ [1, 2]. By property (C)
and Lemma 1(b,d) in the Appendix, fγ(Vt) = γ(t) and Vt = (2 − t)V1 + (t − 1)V2. Let
y = (2−t)γ(1)+(t−1)γ(2). Applying restricted concavity shows that γ(t) = fγ(Vt) ≥ y.
Since y1+y2 = t = γ1(t)+γ2(t) by property (C) and γ(t) ≥ y, we conclude that γ(t) = y.
Since γ(2) = (1, 1), γ(t) = (2− t)(α, 1 − α) + (t− 1)(1, 1) = γα(t) for all t ∈ [1, 2].
The axioms used in Theorem 1 are logically independent. The weighted Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution KSα (Thomson, 1994) fulfills all axioms except strong Pareto
optimality. The equal losses solution ELα for n = 2 (Chun, 1988) fulfills all axioms ex-
cept scale invariance. The asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution lKSα (Dubra, 2001)
fulfills all axioms except restricted concavity.10 It can be shown that Example 3 below
for n = 2 satisfies all axioms except restricted monotonicity.
5 The General Case
We now turn our attention to the general case of n-agent bargaining problems. For this
case, it is well-known that strong Pareto optimality is too strong. For instance, it is
incompatible with monotonicity (even for n = 2; Rosenthal, 1976) and with restricted
monotonicity (for n ≥ 3; Garc´ıa-Segarra and Gine´s-Vilar, 2015). For the case of n
agents, the negotiated aspirations solution has a characterization where strong Pareto
optimality is replaced by its weaker version. The price to pay is adding two additional
axioms. The first is a weak, straightforward version of the contraction independence
axiom introduced by Nash (1950) (see also Chun, 2005).
Restricted contraction independence: For every S, T ∈ Σ0 with m(S) = m(T ), if
S ⊆ T and f(T ) ∈ S, then f(S) = f(T ).
This property (see Roth, 1977) is compatible with restricted monotonicity. The
second axiom is exceedingly weak. It merely states the minimal requirement that, in the
absence of any bargaining conflict, every agent is granted his or her wishes. That is, in
the extreme situation where the utopia point is feasible, the solution must prescribe it.
Utopia fulfillment: For every S ∈ Σ0, if m(S) ∈ S, then f(S) = m(S).
The following result presents the characterization for the general case. Unlike The-
orem 1, the proof does not follow from Peters and Tijs (1985), since the result in that
work is restricted to 2-agent problems.
10The solution of Dubra (2001), which is only defined for n = 2, prescribes the (unique) Pareto optimal
point which dominates KSα(S), and hence it can be considered a lexicographic extension of the solution
by Thomson (1994) in the case of two agents.
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Theorem 2. Consider n-agent bargaining problems. A bargaining solution f satisfies
weak Pareto optimality, scale invariance, restricted monotonicity, restricted concavity,
restricted contraction independence, and utopia fulfillment if and only if there exists
α ∈ ∆n−1 such that f is the negotiated aspirations solution with weights α.
Proof. The negotiated aspirations solution clearly satisfies utopia fulfillment and re-
stricted contraction independence. The remaining properties hold by Proposition 1.
Let f be a bargaining solution fulfilling all properties in the statement. As in the
proof of Theorem 1, define the instrumental sets
Vt =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ t
}
∩ [0, 1]n (1)
for each t ∈ [1, n]. Let α = f(V1). By weak Pareto optimality and Lemma 1(c) in
the Appendix, α ∈ ∆n−1. We want to show that f(S) = NAα(S) for all S ∈ Σ0. We
first establish this for the sets Vt.
Claim. f(Vt) = NA
α(Vt) for all t ∈ [1, n].
By utopia fulfillment, f(Vn) = (1, . . . , 1). By Lemma 2(a) in the Appendix, f(Vt) =(
n−t
n−1
)
α +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
(1, . . . , 1) =
(
n−t
n−1
)
mα(Vt) +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
m(Vt). By Lemma 2(b),
f(Vt) ∈ SPO(Vt). The latter implies that f(Vt) = NA
α(Vt) by definition of NA
α and
Lemma 1(b).
Let S ∈ Σ0. By scale invariance, without loss of generality we can assume that
m(S) = (1, . . . , 1). By 0-comprehensiveness it follows that all unit vectors are in S and
hence, by convexity of S and weak Pareto optimality of f , t =
∑n
i=1 fi(S) ≥ 1. Hence
f(S) ∈ SPO(Vt) (Lemma 1(b)).
Note that m(S ∩ Vt) = (1, . . . , 1) = m(S). By restricted monotonicity, f(S ∩ Vt) ≤
f(S). Since f(S) ∈ S ∩ SPO(Vt) ⊆ S ∩ Vt, restricted contraction independence implies
that f(S) = f(S ∩ Vt). Again by restricted monotonicity, f(S) = f(S ∩ Vt) ≤ f(Vt) and
since f(S) ∈ SPO(Vt), it follows that f(S) = f(Vt) = NA
α(Vt), where the last equality
follows from the claim above. In particular, NAα(Vt) ∈ S and by construction of NA
α
it follows that NAα(S) ≥ NAα(Vt) = f(S).
Applying an analogous argument to the bargaining solution NAα yields NAα(S) =
NAα(Vk) = f(Vk) where k =
∑n
i=1NA
α
i (S). Hence f(Vk) ∈ S ∩ Vk and restricted
contraction independence yields f(S ∩ Vk) = f(Vk). Applying restricted monotonicity,
NAα(S) = f(Vk) = f(S ∩ Vk) ≤ f(S). Together with NA
α(S) ≥ f(S), this yields
f(S) = NAα(S).
We now show that the axioms used in Theorem 2 are logically independent. First,
the weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solution KSα (Thomson, 1994) fails utopia fulfillment
but satisfies all other axioms. Second, following an idea by Peters and Tijs (1984, 1985),
consider monotone paths connecting the disagreement point to the utopia point. For
each such path, define a bargaining solution which picks the maximum point of the path
belonging to the bargaining set. Such a solution fails restricted concavity, but fulfills all
other axioms. For each of the remaining axioms, one of the following examples exhibits
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a bargaining solution failing it but fulfilling the rest. For the sake of concreteness, in all
examples we omit the (straightforward) axiom checks.
Example 1. (Violation of weak Pareto optimality) For each S ∈ Σ0, define G(S) = 0
if
∑n
i=1
si
mi(S)
≤ 1 for all s ∈ S, and G(S) = KS(S) otherwise. This solution agrees
with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution except for the sets which coincide with the convex
hull of (0, . . . , 0) and the points (0, . . . , 0,mi(S), 0, . . .), i = 1, . . . , n. For those sets,
G(S) = 0, in violation of weak Pareto optimality by non-degeneracy.
Example 2. (Violation of scale invariance) Fix α ∈ ∆n−1 with α 6=
(
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
, hence
NAα(S) 6= KS(S). For each S ∈ Σ0, define H(S) = NA
α(S) if m(S) = 1 and H(S) =
KS(S) otherwise. Let S ∈ Σ0 be such that m(S) 6= 1. Taking p =
(
1
m1(S)
, . . . , 1
mn(S)
)
,
we obtain that m(pS) = 1. Hence, H(pS) = NAα(pS) 6= pKS(S) = pH(S) and H fails
scale invariance.
Example 3. (Violation of restricted monotonicity) Given S ∈ Σ0, define
U(S) =
{
x ∈ S
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xi
mi(S)
≥
n∑
i=1
yi
mi(S)
for all y ∈ S
}
.
We adopt a tie-breaking rule to obtain a single-valued solution. Note that U(S) is a
non-empty, compact, and convex set. Denote by ≻L the (strict) lexicographic order on
U(S). That is, given x, y ∈ U(S), we say that x ≻L y if and only if either x1 > y1, or
x1 = y1 and x2 > y2, or x1 = y1, x2 = y2, and x3 > y3, and so on. We say that x L y
if and only if either x = y or x ≻L y. Define
fL(S) = {x ∈ U(S) | x L y for all y ∈ U(S)} .
To see that fL(S) exists and is single-valued, let U
0(S) = U(S) and Uk(S) ={
x ∈ Uk−1(S)
∣∣ xk ≥ yk for all y ∈ Uk−1(S)}, for k = 1, . . . , n. The sets Uk(S) are
nonempty, convex, and compact with U1(S) ⊇ U2(S) ⊇ . . . ⊇ Un(S). Suppose x, y ∈
Un(S). By construction, x1 = y1, x2 = y2, . . . , xn = yn. Hence, fL(S) = U
n(s) is a
singleton. This solution selects one of the outcomes recommended by a normalized ver-
sion of the utilitarian solution. To see that this solution fails restricted monotonicity, let
S, T ∈ Σ0 be given by
S =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1
}
and T =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
x2i ≤ 1
}
.
We have that S ⊆ T , m(S) = m(T ) = (1, . . . , 1), fL(S) = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and fL(T ) =(√
n
n
, . . . ,
√
n
n
)
, in contradiction with restricted monotonicity.
Example 4. (Violation of restricted contraction independence) Consider the sets Vt
given by (1). For each t ∈ [1, n], define L(Vt) = NA
α1(Vt) with α
1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ∆n−1.
For any S ∈ Σ0 with m(S) = 1, let L(S) = L(Vt) where t = max {t
′ ∈ [1, n] | Vt′ ⊆ S }.
Since V1 ⊆ S and S is compact, L(S) is well defined. Finally, whenever m(S) 6= 1, let
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p =
(
1
m1(S)
, . . . , 1
mn(S)
)
and define Li(S) = mi(S)Li(pS) for each i = 1, . . . , n (note that
m(pS) = 1). By Lemma 1(d) in the Appendix, the convex combination of two sets of
the form Vt is also of the same form. Therefore L satisfies restricted concavity.
Note that L(V2) = NA
α(V2) =
(
1, 1
n−1 , . . . ,
1
n−1
)
, hence L(V2) 6= L(V1) = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Define a set S1 ⊆ V2 by
S1 =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n
∣∣∣∣∣ x1 ≤ 1,
n∑
i=2
xi ≤ 1
}
.
For each t > 1 we have that (0, t, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Vt and (0, t, 0, . . . , 0) /∈ S
1. Therefore,
L(S1) = L(V1), in contradiction with restricted contraction independence since S
1 ⊆ V2,
L(V2) ∈ S
1, and L(S1) 6= L(V2).
6 Conclusion
Bargaining solutions have either anchored on the worst-case scenario disagreement point
or the highly desirable but typically unattainable utopia point. The solution of Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) does both, but since a line is fully defined by any two different points
it crosses, any generalization taking bargaining power into account must neglect one. The
proportional solutions of Kalai (1977) anchor on disagreement, and can be seen as the
allocation of potential gains from the worst-case scenario, proportionally to bargaining
power. The weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Thomson (1994) also anchor on
disagreement, but potential gains are allocated proportionally taking into account both
bargaining power and the utopian claims. The equal-losses solution (Chun, 1988) anchors
on utopia and allocates necessary losses (proportionally to bargaining power), but runs
into feasibility problems (Chun and Peters, 1991). Here we propose and characterize a
solution which anchors on utopia, adjusts the utopian aspirations according to bargaining
power to create a new, feasible reference point (hence “negotiated aspirations solution”),
and can then be seen either as allocating gains towards utopia from this new reference
point, or allocating losses from utopia towards the reference point.
The negotiated aspirations solutions has a natural procedural description in terms
of intuitive concepts: bargaining power and maximal aspirations. Further, its axiomatic
characterization requires no conceptual departures from the well-established axioms pre-
viously considered in the literature, which are universally accepted as identifying attrac-
tive characteristics of solutions. For the case of two agents, the negotiated aspirations
solution is the only solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality, scale invariance, the ax-
iom of monotonicity restricted to comparisons among sets with the same utopia point
(restricted monotonicity), and the axiom of concavity restricted in the same sense. For
n agents, the characterization replaces strong with weak Pareto optimality and adds re-
stricted contraction independence plus the minimal requirement that if utopia is actually
attainable (hence there is no conflict), it should be chosen.
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Appendix G Properties of the sets Vt
For each t ∈ [1, n] let Vt be given by (1). The following lemma summarizes the geometric
properties of these sets as required in the proofs in the main text.
Lemma 1. For every t ∈ [1, n],
(a) m(Vt) = (1, . . . , 1);
(b) SPO(Vt) = {x ∈ Vt |
∑n
i=1 xi = t};
(c) WPO(Vt) = SPO(Vt) ∪ {x ∈ Vt | xj = 1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}}; and
(d) Vt =
(
n−t
n−1
)
V1 +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
Vn.
Proof. (a), (b), and (c) are straightforward. To see (d), we proceed by double inclusion.
Let x ∈ V1, y ∈ Vn, and z =
(
n−t
n−1
)
x +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
y. Then z ∈ [0, 1]n and
∑n
i=1 zi =(
n−t
n−1
)∑n
i=1 xi +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)∑n
i=1 yi ≤
(
n−t
n−1
)
(1) +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
(n) = t. Hence, y ∈ Vt.
Let z ∈ Vt. Note that y = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Vn and define x by xi =
(n−1)zi−t+1
n−t . Then,∑n
i=1 xi =
1
n−t ((n− 1)
∑n
i=1 zi + n(1− t)) ≤
1
n−t ((n− 1)t+ n(1− t)) = 1 and x ∈ V1.
Note that
(
n−t
n−1
)
xi+
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
yi =
n−t
n−1
(
(n−1)zi−t+1
n−t
)
+
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
= 1
n−1((n−1)zi) =
zi. Hence, z ∈
(
n−t
n−1
)
V1 +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
Vn.
The next result identifies two useful properties of bargaining solutions satisfying
restricted concavity, when applied to the sets Vt.
Lemma 2. Let f be a bargaining solution for n-agent problems satisfying weak Pareto
optimality, restricted concavity, and utopia fulfillment. Then, for every t ∈ [1, n],
(a) f(Vt) =
(
n−t
n−1
)
f(V1) +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
f(Vn), and
(b) f(Vt) ∈ SPO(Vt).
Proof. (a) By Lemma 1(a), m(V1) = m(Vn). Let z =
(
n−t
n−1
)
f(V1) +
(
1− n−t
n−1
)
f(Vn).
By weak Pareto optimality, f(V1) ∈ WPO(V1) and by Lemma 1(b,c), SPO(V 1) =
WPO(V 1). Hence, by Lemma 1(b),
∑n
i=1 fi(V1) = 1. By utopia fulfillment, f(Vn) =
(1, . . . , 1). We obtain that
∑n
i=1 zi = t. By restricted concavity, f(Vt) ≥ z. Since∑n
i=1 fi(Vt) ≤ t, it follows that f(Vt) = z.
(b) Follows from part (a) and Lemma 1(b).
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